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Hospital Cost Growth 
Mark B. McClellan 
In 1984, the Health Care Financing Administration implemented the prospec- 
tive payment system (PPS) to reimburse hospitals for treating Medicare pa- 
tients. PPS  features payment  on  the  basis of  the  diagnosis-related group 
(DRG), an essentially fixed payment for the entire bundle of medical services 
produced during a hospital admission. DRG outlier payments provide some 
insurance to hospitals for treating patients with extraordinarily high costs or 
long stays within the DRG. Other DRG adjustments, such as higher DRG pay- 
ments for patients with versus without “complicating conditions” and higher 
payments for teaching hospitals, provide limited opportunities for hospitals to 
receive additional compensation for higher costs of care. But DRGs have been 
thought to provide high-powered incentives for efficient production of hospital 
care: reimbursement for an admission in a given DRG should not change much 
as input use varies. 
In many respects, Medicare’s actual experience with hospital costs under 
PPS has not worked out as hoped. Most troubling has been a continued steady 
increase in  intensity per admission, and consequently in average per capita 
expenditures for hospital services in the Medicare program. Between 1984 and 
1990, the Prospective Payment Assessment Commission (199  1) estimated that 
the case-mix index per discharge increased by almost 20%, after adjusting for 
price updates and other policy changes. A 1% increase in the case-mix index 
translates into an additional $750 million per year in Medicare payments; this 
increase in intensity accounts for the bulk of  Medicare hospital expenditure 
increases. As the Prospective Payment Assessment Commission (1  993) has 
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noted, growth in the case mix index is the principal determinant of  hospital 
payment growth; its effect has been “greater than the combined effect of. .  . 
all other policy changes implemented under PPS” (20-21). 
From the standpoint of controlling Medicare hospital expenditure growth, 
the PPS experience has clearly been disappointing. In a related paper (McClel- 
lan  1993), I have argued that a few basic implications of the nature of DRG 
payments, coupled with some understanding of  the internal organization of 
hospital production, can explain the “puzzles” of PPS in the context of a stan- 
dard analysis of production incentives with price regulation. Here I review and 
expand the previous analysis, describing some distinctive institutional features 
of hospital production in more detail and summarizing the results of the static 
model of hospital production designed to capture these features. I then develop 
a dynamic framework to describe how price and cost growth interact in hospi- 
tal production, which suggests that a reimbursement system such as PPS may 
encourage technological change endogenous to the payment rules. Finally, I 
turn to some preliminary evidence on the nature of expenditure-increasing 
technological change in the Medicare program, which appears to be consistent 
with the dynamic framework. 
5.1  Institutional Characteristics of Hospital Production 
This section addresses two related topics that have received limited attention 
in the literature on hospital behavior: the appropriate definition of the “good’ 
produced for patients demanding hospital care, and the nature of the internal 
organization of hospitals. These issues have important implications for the pro- 
duction and regulation of medical care. 
Patients do not demand hospital treatments per se; they demand treatment 
for their particular health problems. “Production” of  health care involves both 
diagnostic and therapeutic treatments, the most intensive of which are adminis- 
tered to patients who have been admitted to a hospital. For most health prob- 
lems, many technological choices exist, and hence many alternative treatment 
intensities are possible. As a result, a hospital admission per se does not consti- 
tute a well-defined product. The following examples, drawn from some of the 
most common and costly diseases in the elderly, illustrate that (1) hospitaliza- 
tions may or may not be required for treatment; (2) when a patient is hospital- 
ized, multiple treatment courses involving quite different medical technologies 
are possible; and (3) these treatment courses can result in different payment 
levels, even in “prospective” reimbursement systems such as Medicare PPS. 
The brief clinical summaries are not intended to imply that all patients with 
each of the health problems are equally appropriate  candidates for all treatment 
alternatives. However, the net benefits of  more intensive treatment may  be 
modest or uncertain for a considerable fraction of patients with a health prob- 151  Medicare Reimbursement and Hospital Cost Growth 
lem, providing considerable opportunities  for physician discretion in treatment 
choices (Park et al. 1986; McClellan and Brook 1992). 
Coronary heart disease. Coronary heart disease is the leading cause of death 
in the United States. In most cases, death is directly or indirectly related to a 
heart attack, or acute myocardial infarction (AMI). Patients with symptoms of 
a heart attack such as crushing chest pain will be treated at a hospital to “rule 
out” AM1 or to manage its complications.  The diagnostic and therapeutic man- 
agement of all heart disease patients may include several intensive procedures: 
cardiac  catheterization,  percutaneous  transluminal  coronary  angioplasty 
(PTCA), and coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) surgery. These technologies 
are substantially  more costly than the less intensive alternatives, which involve 
noninvasive diagnostic studies, drug treatments, and lifestyle counseling. 
Cancel: Treatment modalities for most types of cancer involve some combina- 
tion of surgery, radiation therapy, and chemotherapy. For example, for local- 
ized breast cancer, treatment may involve total or partial mastectomy, followed 
by radiation or chemotherapy. Various cancer treatment regimens have differ- 
ent requirements for the intensity of these treatments and for the frequency of 
inpatient hospital stays. 
Hipfracture. Patients with hip fracture will be admitted to the hospital. De- 
pending on the nature of the fracture, the treatment for setting the fracture may 
involve open reduction (a surgical procedure) or closed reduction (a nonsurgi- 
cal procedure). 
Gall bladder disease. Patients with chronic cholecystitis (gall bladder disease) 
can be managed “medically,” with drugs and dietary modification, or “surgi- 
cally,” with removal of the gall bladder. For patients managed surgically, sev- 
eral types of cholecystectomy procedures are possible. Cholecystectomy  may 
include intraoperative radiographic imaging of the biliary ducts with contrast 
dye enhancement to identify any remaining gallstones. An alternative chole- 
cystectomy technique for uncomplicated cases, laparoscopic cholecystectomy, 
involves a more limited surgical incision and potentially shorter postoperative 
recovery. 
Benign prostatic hypertrophy. Enlargement of  the prostate gland, leading to 
urinary retention, frequency, and hesitancy, is extremely common in elderly 
males. One treatment is prostatectomy (primarily transurethral prostatectomy) 
to remove gland tissue. Alternatively, especially in milder cases, patients can 
simply endure symptoms (e.g., having to get up to urinate in the middle of the 
night). Patients who choose not to have surgery require hospitalization only 
for severe complications. 152  Mark B. McClellan 
Back pain. Back pain is an extremely common chronic health problem. Surgi- 
cal treatments to reduce symptoms include spinal decompression (for pain, 
tingling, or numbness arising from nerve compression), intervertebral diskec- 
tomy and spinal fusion, and laminectomy. Patients who are managed without 
these surgical procedures (through drugs, musculoskeletal therapies, and other 
regimens) may  require hospital treatments such as traction only for severe 
complications. 
Arthritis. Rheumatoid arthritis and osteoarthritis are leading causes of func- 
tional limitations in the elderly, especially elderly females. Many drug regi- 
mens of  increasing strength (and side effects), as well as other nonsurgical 
treatments such as heat baths, are available to reduce pain and limit deteriora- 
tion in affected joints. These treatments generally do not require hospitaliza- 
tion. A more intensive hospital-based alternative is surgical replacement of the 
knee or hip. 
The preceding illustrations, representing a spectrum of  common diseases, 
demonstrate  that any analysis of hospital production should consider incentives 
for treatment of a health problem rather than for production of a particular kind 
of treatment. However, virtually all of the alternative treatments  just described 
lead to different DRG classifications. The structure of  DRGs consequently 
supports a form of  indirect cost sharing, in which payments depend not on 
reported costs but on actual use of particular technologies that have important 
implications for the cost of an admission. In this sense, the DRG system con- 
tinues a historical trend in hospital payment mechanisms toward dependence 
on real measures of resource use. Indeed, hospital payments under the Tax 
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA) system that PPS replaced were 
primarily based on allowed per diems, that is, hospital payments that depended 
on  the  number  of  days  provided.  While  PPS  moved  further  toward  an 
admission-based  payment  system, it  retained  some  features of  intensity- 
related payment. 
Why is PPS  structured so that use of  specific intensive procedures for a 
health problem leads to more generous reimbursement? If  health care were 
produced competitively, then additional payments would not be required to 
encourage hospitals to produce enough intensive treatments that are valued by 
patients. A fixed payment per admission or even per individual would be ade- 
quate; hospitals would simply maximize (costly) intensity subject to the budget 
constraint implied by the payment level. Cost sharing implies a concern about 
imperfect competition: for whatever reason, hospitals would tend to underpro- 
duce intensity unless incentives were softened. Myriad reasons for market fail- 
ures have been proposed in health care, and it is beyond the scope of this paper 
to review all of them here. I concentrate on one important tension that has been 
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incentives, financial and otherwise, to maximize patient welfare and, on the 
other, hospital incentives to maximize financial and other rents. 
Theoretical papers on the optimal regulation of  hospitals have mostly as- 
sumed that the incentives facing hospitals match the incentives of the physi- 
cians practicing in them, at least up to the (costly) implementation of  appro- 
priate  internal incentives.’ One exception is  Harris (1977),  who describes 
hospital production as a noncooperative game between physicians engaged in 
specific relationships with patients on the one hand and hospital managers 
making investment decisions involving capacity, equipment, and staff hiring 
on the other. Physicians generally are not employees of the hospital? but rather 
are participants in highly incomplete contracts with both the hospital and their 
patients. When a patient seeks care for a health problem, the patient contracts 
for “appropriate” medical treatment, whatever the health problem turns out to 
be. Because these treatment contingencies are too numerous to describe ex 
ante or to verify ex post, patients and physicians cannot sign a complete con- 
tract that specifies how the physician will treat every possible medical contin- 
gency that may arise in the course of the treatment episode. Just as contingent 
production decisions are not specified in the contract between a medical expert 
and a patient, they are not specified in the physician’s contractual arrangement 
with the hospital. Hospital contracts for admitting privileges specify few ex- 
plicit restrictions on the use of hospital capital that is within the purview of the 
physician’s specialty. 
Harris emphasizes the transactions costs of all these treatment intensity de- 
cisions and the importance of  physician preferences (as opposed to those of 
hospital managers) in resource allocation decisions for individual patients. But 
the problem is even more fundamental than transactions costs. Specific invest- 
ments are substantial: a physician treating a particular patient develops detailed 
knowledge of the idiosyncrasies of the patient’s case. In theory, physicians or 
hospital managers could hold up patients for the value of these specific invest- 
ments at critical junctures in the course of  treatment, when the patient’s life 
may literally be at stake. These characteristics of hospital production suggest 
that markets or explicit contracts would represent costly approaches to foster- 
ing efficient production. 
In this view, the traditional organizational structure of the hospital may rep- 
1. An  exception is Ellis and McGuire (1986), who model hospital production as a reflection of 
treatment decisions by physicians. However, the marginal rate of substitution between patient and 
hospital objectives (that is, the relative weight placed on maximizing hospital profits versus max- 
imizing patient welfare) and hence the extent of the agency problem is treated as exogenous in the 
model, there is no role for hospital investment decisions in influencing physician decisions, and 
hospital payment is modeled as fixed regardless of treatment choice. These features may  have 
important implications for hospital production decisions. 
2. The physicians that tend to be contractual employees-radiologists,  anesthesiologists, and 
pathologists-prove  the rule, since these physicians specialize in  technical aspects of hospital 
production rather than making decisions as agents for particular patients. 154  Mark B. McClellan 
resent not so much a reflection of physicians’ desire for autonomy in treating 
patients (Starr 1984)  as an institutional mechanism to limit the power of incen- 
tives in the physician’s other role, as an agent for the hospital. Physicians do 
not control investment decisions for the hospital or own hospital capital, but 
they largely retain the rights of control for utilization of hospital capital equip- 
ment and other reso~rces.~  Altering these residual rights of control over treat- 
ment decisions, for example through direct employment relationships  between 
physicians and hospitals, would probably alter these residual rights of control 
and hence treatment decisions for hospitalized  patient^.^ 
Thus, if a hospital finds that treating patients in the DRG for congestive 
heart failure (CHF) is unprofitable, it cannot order its admitting physicians not 
to treat patients with CHF. Physicians control specific admission decisions. 
Even if such a prohibition were technically possible, it might impose consider- 
able externalities on hospital production. Many patients with CHF initially ar- 
rive at the emergency department with shortness of breath, water weight gain, 
feelings of  weakness and lightheadedness, or even vaguer symptoms. Only 
after some evaluation of the specific case can the diagnosis of CHF be made 
and treatment initiated. By this time, physicians practicing at the hospital have 
invested in a relationship with the patient that involves some specific knowl- 
edge of the idiosyncrasies of the case. Similarly, CHF is a problem that fre- 
quently accompanies other common diseases-such  as a recent heart attack, 
diabetes, or hypertension-which  also may require hospitalization (possibly 
at the same time) and which may represent relatively profitable DRGs for the 
hospital. Prohibiting or restricting admissions for the diagnosis would limit 
gains from relationship-specific investments between the patient and physi- 
cians that permit the delivery of more effective care for many other diagnoses. 
Hospital managers can, however, affect the environment in which physicians 
make these specific treatment decisions. For diseases such as CHF that involve 
“nonspecific” technologies, hospital choices about capacity investments in 
hospital beds, laboratory equipment, and support staffing levels may indirectly 
affect physician decisions on treatment intensity, but only at the cost of affect- 
ing treatment decisions for many health problems. In contrast, for diagnoses 
and procedures requiring investments in specific capacity, the choices of hospi- 
tal managers can significantly affect use of the treatments and admissions at 
the DRG level. For example, if  a hospital finds cardiac catheterization un- 
profitable, it need not prohibit its physicians from catheterizing specific pa- 
tients. It need only close its catheterization laboratory. By deciding its invest- 
3. Some other capital-intensive professions in which the appropriateness of specific production 
decisions is difficult for managers to observe have similar arrangements. In many research labora- 
tories, for example, the capital equipment may belong to the academic institution, but the research- 
ers who use it are paid largely through grants obtained independently rather than through em- 
ployee relationships. 
4.  The consequences of the nature of the employment relationship for production choices and 
efficiency are examined in detail in Grossman and Hart  (1986), which provides some of the foun- 
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ment level in the technologies needed to produce catheterization, the hospital 
can effectively specialize or not in catheterization DRGs. Similarly, by  de- 
termining whether to provide the specialized equipment and personnel re- 
quired for cancer treatments or particular kinds of surgical  procedures, hospital 
managers can significantly influence admissions in these DRGs. 
Regardless of the nature of medical technologies, the physician faces inher- 
ent agency conflicts when patient and hospital interests do not coincide. They 
will not coincide if intensive treatments are costly and if hospitals are not fully 
insured against costs of  care. Vesting the residual rights of production deci- 
sions in  the physician, and  separating physician reimbursement incentives 
from hospital reimbursement incentives, clearly reduces the strength of the 
physician-hospital  agency relationship. To the extent that physicians are reim- 
bursed at cost for the services they provide, so that the trade-offs they  face 
between patient welfare and their own net profits (including effort costs) are 
minimized, then physician agency for patients may be much stronger than phy- 
sician agency for the hospital at the margin. 
Whether this allocation of noncontractible rights of  control is optimal de- 
pends on hospital and patient incentives and on the nature of  the alternative 
technologies that may be involved in patient care. Today, it is easy to consider 
other allocations of residual control. However, in both traditional insurance 
arrangements and most managed-care plans, patients typically face limited 
out-of-pocket prices for medical services; Medicare inpatient services are ap- 
proximately fully ins~red.~  If patients were fully informed and controlled mar- 
ginal treatment decisions, they would consequently demand all services with 
positive net benefits. The implication is that residual control by physicians- 
supported by  loose contractual relationships with hospitals and physician pay- 
ment systems in which the physician tends not to be the residual claimant for 
substantial costs-strengthens  patient agency, leading physicians to prefer 
more intensive treatment patterns than hospital managers prefer under fixed- 
price reimbursement.6 
Together, these institutional  characteristics  imply that a model of the internal 
organization of hospital production decisions must incorporate the following 
features (McClellan 1993): 
1. Physicians-who  have the most knowledge about the benefits of alterna- 
5. The Part A deductible is limited to the cost of one hospital day. While Part B insurance covers 
only 80% of  physician allowed charges, over 80% of beneficiaries have supplemental insurance 
that eliminates this residual cost sharing. 
6. Another advantage of  explicitly modeling the internal organization of hospital production is 
that the consequences of  other employment arrangements can be considered  explicitly. Strong 
residual control by physicians has other costs besides limiting the power of hospital managers to 
influence use of some hospital technologies. For example, the costs of coordinating treatment for 
an illness beyond the level of  an admission may be higher than it would be if the hospital (or 
HMO) employed all physicians involved in treating the illness. The costs and benefits of the vari- 
ous possibilities for vertical and horizontal integration in the production of  treatment for an illness 
have not been explored much by economists. In this paper, I consider only “traditional” arrange- 
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tive medical technologies for specific patients-are  dual agents, for patients 
in the production of medical treatments and for hospitals in the use of hospital 
capital. The incomplete contractual arrangements that form the basis for spe- 
cific production relationships between physicians and patients, and between 
physicians and hospitals, leave the residual rights of  control for decisions to 
fulfill these production relationships primarily to the physician. 
2.  These  open-ended contractual arrangements, coupled with  generous 
demand-side insurance and a physician payment system that is largely inde- 
pendent of hospital profits, suggest that physicians involved in specific agency 
relationships with patients weigh patient welfare more than hospital profits, 
and in any case more than hospital managers weigh patient versus hospital ob- 
jectives. 
3. The nature of  the medical technologies used to treat particular illnesses 
influences how hospital payment incentives influence equilibrium production 
decisions. For treatments dependent on specific hospital investments, hospital 
managers have more control over production levels; for treatments involving 
nonspecific technologies that  are difficult to ration, physicians have  more 
control. 
5.2  A Model of the Production of Medical Treatment Intensity 
McClellan (  1993) formalizes the noncooperative game of hospital produc- 
tion described in the previous section. Here I sketch the main results for invest- 
ment in a “simple” intensive technology, one that may be used in the treatment 
of a single health problem. There are four parties: fully insured patients with 
a health problem who decide which hospital to visit for treatment; physicians 
who learn the patient’s expected benefits from alternative treatments and make 
treatment intensity decisions; hospitaZs that provide medical technologies for 
treatment; and a regulator who sets the price schedule for hospitals. The struc- 
ture of the game is as follows: 
1.  The regulator sets prices for less intensive treatment (without the inten- 
sive technology) and more intensive treatment for the health problem. 
2.  The hospital invests in medical technologies that constitute the environ- 
ment for medical treatment. 
3.  Physicians observe hospital investment choices, contract with hospitals 
to provide medical services, and define their equilibrium treatment intensity 
choices. 
4.  Patients observe some measure of hospital quality related to its invest- 
ment decisions and, possibly with guidance from physicians, choose a hospital 
for treatment. 
5.  The physician observes the patient’s expected benefit from alternative 
treatments and chooses treatment intensity. There are two treatment intensity 
choices, r = 0 (less intensive) and r = 1 (more intensive). The performance of 157  Medicare Reimbursement and Hospital Cost Growth 
r = 0 or r = 1 is observable and verifiable, and hence can be used as the basis 
for a reimbursement contract. 
6. Patients receive treatment and hospitals are reimbursed for services. 
Suppose that  the nature of  the technology is such that the hospital can 
choose a capacity level; for example, staffing and equipment choices in a car- 
diac catheterization laboratory can effectively determine the number of pa- 
tients with heart disease who receive catheterization. Because investment in 
the capacity to produce the intensive treatment is costly, hospital managers will 
invest in intensive capacity until the marginal benefits of investment (in terms 
of additional demand attracted and patients treated profitably) equal the mar- 
ginal costs (in terms of the costs of additional capacity and the potential losses 
on the fraction of patients treated intensively). In turn, as more capacity be- 
comes available, physicians are able to treat more patients intensively (the 
“marginal” patient treated intensively has a lower perceived benefit), and more 
intensive treatment patterns attract more patients. Denote the regulated pay- 
ment level as p”  and p’ as the regulated prices for less intensive and more 
intensive treatment, co  and c’  as the corresponding marginal costs, I’ as the 
hospital investment in intensive capacity,  6(Z’) as the expected net benefit (per- 
ceived by  the physician) of more intensive treatment for the marginal patient 
receiving it, F(6) denotes the share of  patients treated with r = 0, and q(6) 
denotes aggregate demand (decreasing in 6, i.e., increasing in intensity). The 
hospital will choose capacity I’ such that 
-.[pa  1  -  co] + -.[PI  1  -  c‘] = -.[(p”  1  -  c”) -  (p’ -  c’)], 
Toe  rll0  %e 
where qoe  = (aF/&3).(O/F)  is the elasticity of treatment with r = 0 with respect 
to 6; qlo  = -(a(l -  F)/dO).(O/(l -  F))  is the elasticity of treatment with r = 
1 and with respect to 6; and qqe  = -q’.O/q is the elasticity of  demand with 
respect to intensity q(1).  All of these “quality elasticities”  are defined to be pos- 
itive.’ 
The equation shows that equilibrium intensity increases and equilibrium 
profits*  decrease as the elasticity of demand with respect to intensity increases. 
In the extreme case of perfectly elastic demand, the zero-profit constraint holds 
and intensity is maximized subject to the price constraints. For  a given p”, 
equilibrium intensity also increases as p’ increases, and the difference in mar- 
gins [p” -  co] -  [$ -  c’] decreases (if p”  is set high enough for production 
to occur). Equilibrium intensity will only be first-best for a particular combina- 
tion of prices, and actual intensity would vary across markets as a function of 
demand elasticity. 
This model of equilibrium intensity choices for hospital investment in a spe- 
cific technological capacity demonstrates that the quality and cost of hospital 
7. McClellan (1993) describes the technical properties of this solution in more detail. 
8. For nonprofit hospitals, economic rents are possible even if profits are not. 158  Mark B. McCIellan 
production need not depend on physician preferences in any direct way. How- 
ever, it is easy to imagine other kinds of medical technologies where physician 
preferences would be much more important in determining equilibrium choice. 
Specific investments in capacity are an extreme case; for other technologies, 
physician objectives are more relevant to equilibrium intensity choices. 
Many technologies involve a more or less binding capacity choice but are 
not specific to the treatment of a particular health problem. For example, hospi- 
tal managers typically make decisions about opening a hospital bed, purchas- 
ing a computerized tomography (CT) scanner, or providing a chemical ana- 
lyzer for laboratory tests, but they have  much less control over how  these 
technologies are used in practice. Because the hospital cannot direct their use 
to specific kinds of patients, it can only choose an optimal aggregate intensity 
level for all the health problems. It does so considering how physicians will 
allocate marginal units of capacity among patients with the various health 
problems, and the implications of these decisions for profits. In addition, some 
specific and nonspecific investments by hospitals may represent “line of busi- 
ness” decisions rather than capacity choices. For example, a hospital can de- 
cide whether to stock specific drugs such as thrombolytic agents (for heart 
attacks) or less specific drugs such as antihypertensive and  pain-reducing 
drugs (for many types of patients), but it cannot easily choose a capacity for 
these treatments. Hospitals can make binary choices about whether to adopt 
these technologies, knowing that physicians will choose the treatment pattern 
that they prefer. 
McClellan (1993) formalizes a model of these hospital investment decisions 
as well. For example, in deciding whether to adopt a “line of business” technol- 
ogy, the hospital’s adoption decision is based on profits if it does or does not 
adopt; if the hospital adopts, then physician preferences and not hospital pref- 
erences determine equilibrium intensity levels for use of the technology. Even 
if  hospital production is not very competitive, physician decisions can thus 
lead to more intensive treatment (i.e., lower rents and more spending on de- 
sired technology) than hospital managers would prefer. 
Most medical technologies involve physician effort costs between the ex- 
tremes of investments in fixed capacity and in a line of business. For example, 
congestion may  make physician effort costs an increasing function of  their 
intensity choice, as scanners or operating rooms become more crowded. Hos- 
pitals must trade off higher unit production costs associated with congestion 
against the effects of congestion on limiting resource use; the model is qualita- 
tively similar to the capacity-constraint case. Hospitals may also make costly 
investments in technologies that influence physician use of other technologies. 
For example, hospitals may invest in monitoring systems that require physi- 
cians to justify particular admissions or long stays, in computer technologies 
that make it easier to order certain tests or drugs but harder to order others, 
and other “utilization management” investments that are not only costly to the 
hospital but also to the physician. Such investments are not first-best, but may 159  Medicare Reimbursement and Hospital Cost Growth 
be the best available option to hospital managers when their preferences con- 
flict with those of the physicians. 
This discussion suggests that optimal regulation of  medical prices should 
consider not only price levels but also the extent of  price aggregation. Any 
administered price system will lead to efficient production of  the particular 
bundles of services for which prices are set exogenously: the fixed price makes 
the producer the residual claimant for all savings resulting from cost minimiza- 
tion in production of the services. However, disaggregating  payments for treat- 
ment of  a particular health problem so that the more intensive treatment re- 
ceives a higher payment encourages more use of the intensive treatment than 
would be supported by a single, aggregated price. Administered price systems 
for medical care, as for other industries, are not new. The so-called cost-based 
hospital reimbursement system that Medicare PPS replaced was such a disag- 
gregated administered price system. Hospitals could not charge any desired 
price for services billed to Medicare; instead, hospital regulators reviewed re- 
ported hospital costs for their “reasonableness”  in relation to the services pro- 
vided. Many large private insurers continue to rely on such disaggregated ad- 
ministered price systems today for hospital services; they are also widely used 
for reimbursement of physician services.  At the opposite extreme, some health 
maintenance organizations (HMOs) use fixed-price per capita contracts with 
hospitals or physicians for providing all medical services for a given popu- 
lation. 
Medicare PPS is between these extremes. The system provides a single pay- 
ment per hospitalization, which is a more aggregated level of  administered 
prices than the cost-based reimbursement system that it replaced. However, 
some particular treatments or types of treatments-primarily  intensive surgi- 
cal procedures-still  define administered price groups. In contrast to the cur- 
rent DRG system, one can imagine a more aggregated DRG system at the level 
of diagnoses only.g 
If hospitals have market power and can effectively control treatment inten- 
sity, increasing the aggregation of the pricing system reduces the costs of pro- 
ducing care for a health problem through intensity reductions. Such incentives 
may be too high-powered. On the other hand, setting price equal to cost for 
each alternative treatment provides no financial incentive for the hospital to 
limit treatment intensity; this is the same kind of problem that “prospective” 
payment was  intended to  address. There is  no  conflict between  physician 
agency for patients and for hospitals with respect to the intensity choices that 
are each reimbursed at cost. Thus, pricing admissions for an intensive treat- 
9. Diagnoses themselves may also be more or less aggregated. DRGs for most major diagnostic 
categories include a number  of specific diagnoses (e.g., AMI, deep venous thrombophlebitis), 
some less specific diagnoses (e.g., chest pain), and catchall residual categories (other circulatory 
system diagnoses). Here I focus on the effects of allowing DRG classification  to depend on treat- 
ment intensity decisions. 160  Mark B. McClellan 
ment at its cost will tend to encourage its use to the point that marginal benefits 
are close to zero, though the treatment itself will be produced efficiently. 
An intuitive solution to this dilemma is for the regulator to “split the differ- 
ence” in setting prices for the alternative treatments. If regulators have some 
knowledge of the demand function and the distribution of net benefit levels 
from more intensive treatment, they can use the equation derived in McClellan 
(1993) to solve for the set of prices that implements the desired intensity level. 
Returning to the notation of the model, since treatment intensity is increasing 
in (p’ -  Po),  this procedure involves setting a price for r = 0 (the less intensive 
treatment) greater than co  and a price increment for r = 1 less than the cost 
difference (c’ -  co). While such a “first-best” rule seems to have strong infor- 
mational requirements, changes in the Medicare price structure that are clearly 
welfare-improving can presumably be accomplished with much more limited 
information. In particular, moving away from paying the full cost differential 
(on average) for a more intensive treatment should reduce incentives to provide 
the more intensive treatment in cases of minimal expected benefit. 
5.3  Medicare Price Regulation and the Dynamics of Medical 
Treatment Intensity 
In this section, I illustrate the dynamic implications of the Medicare price 
rule based  on the model reviewed in  section 5.2.  I assume no  exogenous 
changes in technology over time to focus on endogenous  technological change 
resulting from the PPS price rules. These DRG pricing rules include unbundled 
DRGs for some intensive treatments, and price updates that essentially make 
the current DRG price a function of average charges for patients in the DRG 
in a previous year (lagged “yardstick” competition). 
The dynamic implications can be illustrated qualitatively with phase dia- 
grams. Consider a true DRG; that is, reimbursement is a fixed price for the 
diagnosis regardless of  the treatment intensity level chosen. Figure 5.1 illus- 
trates the current Medicare pricing rule for a DRG of setting p,+,  = c,, where 
c, is the average cost in the DRG in period t.l0 If  there are a large number of 
identical hospitals, the impact of intensity choices by a particular hospital will 
have  no effect on price in subsequent periods, so hospitals will not  behave 
strategically, and all will choose the same equilibrium intensity and cost for a 
given price. At X,  p,(X)  is lower than c,(X), so p,+,(X)  increases to offset the 
difference. At  p,(Y)  is higher than c,(Y),  so p,+,(Y)  falls to offset the differ- 
ence. At Z, p,(Z)  equals c,(Z),  so p,+,(Z)  is unchanged. Assuming for now that 
regulators can measure hospital costs accurately, it is evident that a line with 
10. The actual Medicare pricing rule is to set price equal to a conversion factor times the relative 
weight of a particular DRC, where the weight is determined by the ratio of  charges in the DRG to 
average charges for all Medicare patients in year f -  2. The conversion factor is set to achieve a 
particular total expenditure target. Thus the price update rule is exact only if the conversion factor 
updates hospital output prices by the rate of increase in hospital input prices. 161  Medicare Reimbursement and Hospital Cost Growth 
unitary slope through the origin traces out the set of (p,,  c,)  combinations for 
which p,+,  will be unchanged; this is the dpldt = p  = 0 equilibrium line. To 
the northwest, p > 0; to the southeast, p < 0. 
Figure 5.2  illustrates  a complementary relationship  for the dynamics of 
equilibrium cost. If cost happened to be very low in a period when a very high 
price was offered, cost will increase (the higher price increases the returns to 
attracting more demand). Thus, in the southeast corner of  figure 5.2, for ex- 
ample at point Z  c,, ,(Y)  >  c,(Y).  In contrast, if equilibrium cost happened to 
be very high and a low price were introduced, cost would fall through intensity 
reductions. Thus, in the northeast corner, for example at point X, c,+,(X)  < 
c,(X).  At  point Z, cost and price are such that no equilibrium adjustment is 
necessary, so C = 0. A sample C = 0 line is traced out in the figure; the line 
reflects an  equilibrium cost function that becomes less sensitive to price at 
higher price levels. Different demand functions, intensity costs, distributions 
of expected net benefits to patients, and degrees of physician control over in- 
tensity choices will generate different forms for C = 0. Intensity is increasing 
in costs, so the d = 0 mapping also implies an equilibrium intensity level 6 as 
a function of price. 
C 
P-0 




Fig. 5.2  Dynamics of hospital costs: an example 162  Mark B. McClellan 
Combining the C = 0 and @  = 0 relationships, as in figure 5.3, illustrates 
how the PPS might influence the dynamics of equilibrium cost and intensity 
levels in the DRG. In this example, two points comprise equilibrium price-cost 
relationships, A and B. A is an unstable equilibrium, since any perturbation 
away from A will tend to move farther from A. B is a stable equilibrium, since 
local perturbations tend to return to B.  A key feature is that at B the slope of 
the p = 0 function is greater than that of the C = 0 function. The phase diagram 
does not depict time to convergence, but the time course of a sample intensity 
path from point W to point B is illustrated in figure 5.4. Cost and intensity first 
fall then rise to converge on B (that is, intensity first rises, then falls). 
Note that, if costs are measured accurately, the lj = 0 line also comprises 
the zero-profit line for hospital production. One feature of  figure 5.5, that 
c = 0 equilibria could occur in a range where p >  c, may seem implausible. 
However, it is possible if  cross-subsidies exist (e.g., hospital investments are 
C  If 
P 
Fig. 5.3  Stable dynamic equilibrium 
C-0 
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C 
0  c-0 
P 
Fig. 5.5  Low-intensity dynamic equilibrium 
nonspecific), if hospital costs are subsidized from other sources (e.g., separate 
reimbursement of  capital costs, as described below, or subsidies from non- 
Medicare patients), if hospital-reported cost estimates are biased upward, or if 
other arguments in the hospital objective function besides patient welfare can 
be disguised as necessary costs of care. I return to some of these possibilities 
momentarily. 
If none of these possibilities exist, figure 5.5 represents a more realistic path 
in the case where hospitals have market power. Point A  represents a stable 
equilibrium, occurring at the minimal intensity  level. At any given price,  a 
hospital with market power can earn positive price-cost margins on average by 
decreasing quality slightly below the level that maximizes consumer welfare 
(and earns zero profits). Consequently, average cost is less than price. Thus the 
C = 0 curve will generally have a flatter slope and be located to the right of the 
p  = 0 curve over the range of prices in which hospitals can choose intensity 
levels above the minimum. The updated price (equal to observed cost in the 
previous period) will be lower, leading to a lower optimal intensity level, and 
this downward spiral continues until the minimum intensity level is reached. 
In practice, of course, there is no distinct minimal intensity level of medical 
care; at the extreme, hospital care would simply move to an outpatient setting. 
However, higher equilibrium intensity levels (or at least a slower rate of 
decline) are possible if the technologies used at equilibrium are such that phy- 
sicians acting  as patient  agents  control  intensity  or  if  hospitals  face near- 
perfect competition. Whenever hospital demand is perfectly elastic or hospi- 
tals maximize patient  welfare for other reasons, any point along the p  = 0 
line is a stable equilibrium. Intensity is maximized subject to the zero-profit 
constraint, so price equals cost for any price at least as high as the minimum 
intensity level of hospital production requires. Thus, as shown in figure 5.6, an 
infinite number of  stable equilibria are possible; the particular equilibrium that 
exists depends only on the initial price level. 
Perfect competition or physician choices leading to intensity maximization 





Fig. 5.6  Multiple dynamic equilibria with perfect competition 
C 
c=o  . 
P 
Fig. 5.7  Unstable dynamic intensity growth 
more worrisome situation, in which the price rule encourages dynamic in- 
creases in intensity. The equilibrium c = 0 curve is above the equilibrium  @ = 
0 curve in the relevant range of prices and costs. Equilibrium A is unstable: 
from any initial condition with cost or price beyond A,  cost and price will 
continue to increase over time as long as the C = 0 line is above the @ = 0 
line. This instability is a general characteristic of pricing rules that increase the 
steepness of the c = 0 line. Three scenarios that tend to lead to such relation- 
ships are considered below: separate cost-based reimbursement of specific di- 
mensions of intensity, nonprofit hospital objectives, and overestimation of hos- 
pital marginal production costs in the reimbursement formulas. 
In some respects the Medicare pricing rule is less high-powered than sug- 
gested by  the fixed-price rules described in the preceding figures. Consider 
the extreme case of disaggregated pricing at average cost for each treatment, 
preserving the incentive to produce the treatment efficiently but making hospi- 
tal profits zero regardless of intensity choice. Then every point on the c = 0 
line can be a dynamic equilibrium. (In fact, any intensity level in which price 
equals cost is sustainable.) Medicare actually reimburses only certain dimen- 165  Medicare Reimbursement and Hospital Cost Growth 
sions of  treatment intensity separately, but this can still encourage broader in- 
tensity and cost increases in the treatment of a disease. In general, as the previ- 
ous discussion indicated, increasing the price differential between alternative 
intensity levels appears to increase the steepness of the market equilibrium 
(c = 0) curve, increasing the probability of unstable cost growth.lI 
Another possible cause of unstable intensity growth, even if measured costs 
are correct, is the existence of nonprofit objectives in hospital objective func- 
tions. Only a small fraction of hospitals are for-profit, so that most hospitals 
should not be expected to show much total accounting profit. To  the extent 
that such nonprofit objectives translate into higher observed costs of treating 
Medicare patients, they will tend to push hospital c = 0 curves toward-if  not 
above-the  p = 0 curve, increasing the probability of dynamic cost and inten- 
sity increases in the absence of technological change. 
An additional potential source of instability is mismeasurement of marginal 
production costs. A large literature documents the difficulty of correctly esti- 
mating “true” production costs in multiproduct firms in other industries. Fun- 
damental cost estimation problems such as allocating costs in joint production 
or calculating true economic depreciation  rates for assets that may be expensed 
or depreciated according to standard accounting formulas are no different for 
hospitals. Such detailed cost estimation is practically infeasible anyway. Medi- 
care’s cost estimates for setting DRG prices are obtained from “ghost” bills for 
hospital charges that would have been generated if the beneficiary were a pri- 
vate patient.12 Further, because DRG prices are updated based on average 
charges in the DRG relative to national average charges,I3  the reimbursement 
system tends to favor treatments for which true cost-to-charge  ratios are low. 
In particular, the reimbursement system favors DRGs that rely more heavily 
on  capital-intensive treatments such as operative procedures or laboratory 
tests. These DRGs have the lowest measured cost-to-charge ratios (Rogowski 
and Byrne 1991). Other features of PPS also favor more capital-intensive  treat- 
ments. Teaching hospitals receive an  indirect medical education adjustment to 
their DRG payments proportional to their ratio of interns and residents to hos- 
pital beds. Since the adjustment is proportional, it provides larger increments 
to reimbursement for admissions in more intensive DRGs. Finally, Medicare 
payments for hospital capital expenditures were cost-based through  1991: 
11. Of  course, reimbursing some dimensions of treatment intensity at higher levels also affects 
the form of the p = 0 curves for treatment of the health problem in ways that cannot easily be 
captured in a two-dimensional phase diagram. In general, as the static model indicated, smaller 
intensity price differentials lead to higher equilibrium intensity levels; if the resulting cost in- 
creases lead to further average price increases, the cycle may continue over time. 
12. The relationship of hospital charge data to “true” costs may  be declining. Most hospitals 
provide special discounts to many large payers (e.g., Blue Cross, HMOs, preferred provider organ- 
izations [PPOs]). Charges to residual third-party payers may be higher as a result, and in any event 
may bear less of a direct relationship to actual hospital costs of care. 
13. Charge-based weights were first used in the fiscal year 1988 PPS DRG updates. Prior to 
that, cost-based weights were used, where costs were calculated from reported hospital charges 
using hospital-specific  cost-to-charge  ratios. 166  Mark B. McClellan 
Medicare reimbursed hospitals for 85% of its “share” of capital purchases (i.e., 
0.85  times the proportion of  Medicare admissions at the hospital times the 
capital purchase). The pass-through payment system for capital costs is being 
gradually phased out over a ten-year period (“prospective” capital payments 
will be included in DRG payments), but pass-throughs will still be larger for 
the more intensive, treatment-based DRGs. Thus, particularly for intensive 
DRGs requiring substantial investments in equipment, reported costs (and 
prices) may be greater than true marginal costs to the hospital. 
The dynamic instability of treatment intensity is further complicated by the 
mechanism for updating Medicare prices. The “conversion factor” between 
DRG relative weights and dollar payment levels is set so that if  the current 
period’s DRG admission patterns are identical to the prior period’s DRG ad- 
mission patterns, aggregate hospital payments will increase at a target growth 
rate. This updating mechanism has consequences for the dynamic reallocation 
of  resources to health problems between single-DRG health problems and 
health problems for which DRGs are available for multiple intensity levels. 
Suppose that all treatments for health problem A are aggregated into a single 
DRG at price pA(r),  and that treatments for health problem B are divided into 
a less intensive DRG at price p”,( t) and a more intensive DRG at price pL( t) > 
p,(t).  Assume that the number of  patients with the health problem in each 
period n,  and n,  is fixed and that production of care for A is competitive, so 
that ?,(t) =  pA(t)  (the dynamic problem is worse if it is not). Assume that the 
current (price, cost) state is such that the use of the more intensive treatment 
for problem B is increasing (that is, 6,  is decreasing). The current price for a 
DRG is a function of its relative weight o(  t -  1) in the previous period (aver- 
age cost per admission in the DRG divided by  the average cost of all admis- 
sions) times the conversion factor +( t), which solves 
+(t)*{nA  *  oA(t  -  I) + n,  .[~(6,(t  - l)).o;(t -  111 
+ [l -  F(6,(t -  l))wA(t -  l)]} = e(t -  l).g(t), 
where t(t -  1) is total cost in the previous period, and g(t) is the exogenous 
target  growth rate for the current period. If  the rate of  change of  F(6,). 
(c; -  c;) exceeds g, then +(t)  will decrease over time, leading to a decline in 
price (and cost) for treatment of  health problem A and a reallocation of  re- 
sources to health problem B. Even if  the production of A is competitive, the 
intensity of treatment for problem A will decline over time due to an externality 
effect of increasing intensity for problem B induced by the update rule.I4 
This theoretical evaluation of  intensity dynamics indicates that PPS rules 
are unlikely to lead to dynamic cost-intensity equilibria with any particularly 
14. In  recent years, PPS updates have been based on target growth rates lower than measured 
hospital cost inflation. To the extent that this reflects true price ratcheting, it can be captured in the 
phase diagrams above by  a counterclockwise rotation of the p = 0 line. Thus it tends to lead to 
treatment equilibria at  lower intensity levels and is less likely to result in unstable growth; the 
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desirable properties, if they lead to cost equilibria at all. The next section pres- 
ents some preliminary empirical evidence consistent with the model of reim- 
bursement dynamics suggested here. 
5.4  Preliminary Empirical Evidence 
The model developed in sections 5.2 and 5.3 has a number of  empirical 
predictions. In this section, I describe preliminary evidence on two of  them. 
First, facing some competitive pressures, hospitals have minimal incentives to 
limit dimensions of treatment intensity that involve technologies reimbursed 
through treatment-based DRGs; if the treatments themselves are produced ef- 
ficiently, these costs will be shared almost completely. Second, if demand for 
hospital services is not perfectly elastic in intensity, dynamic changes in treat- 
ment intensity are likely to occur independently of any exogenous technologi- 
cal change. In particular, dynamic intensity growth is likely for health prob- 
lems where reimbursement differences reflect  cost differences, leading to 
steeper equilibrium price-cost relationships, or where measured marginal pro- 
duction costs overstate true costs. Conversely, for health problems grouped into 
true diagnosis-based DRGs, declines in intensity over time are likely because 
the PPS price update mechanism tends to increase the share of reimbursement 
devoted to health problems in which cost increases can occur through shifts to 
more intensive DRGs. 
To illustrate the practical consequences of the structure of the DRG reim- 
bursement system, I first present evidence on one particular health problem, 
AMI. This very common health problem in the elderly accounts, directly or 
indirectly, for much of,the mortality and hospital use associated with coronary 
heart disease. The data are derived from all hospital discharge abstracts filed 
over a two-year period by all elderly Americans hospitalized with a new AM1 
in  1987. The sample thus includes data from 522,506 hospitalizations for 
205,021 elderly AM1 patients (see McClellan and Newhouse 1993 for details 
of the data-set creation process). Table 5.1 summarizes  demographic character- 
istics and some important treatment intensity decisions for these patients. In 
1987, approximately 23% of elderly AM1 patients underwent cardiac catheter- 
ization, an invasive procedure, and approximately 13% of these patients under- 
went a further intensive revascularization procedure, PTCA, or CABG surgery. 
Approximately  87%  of  patients  spent  at  least  one  day  in  a  specialized 
coronary- or intensive-care-unit bed (CCU/ICU), including 84% of patients 
who did not undergo any invasive procedure (second column). 
These intensive treatments have  different implications for hospital reim- 
bursement. Admissions for AM1 patients who do not undergo intensive proce- 
dures are categorized into DRG 121 (AM1 with complicating conditions), 122 
(AM1 without complicating conditions), or  123 (AMI, expired). The three 
DRGs differ somewhat in reimbursement levels, reflecting patient disease se- 
verity (ideally independent of  hospital treatment choices) that is correlated Table 5.1  Characteristics and Technology Use for Elderly Patients with Acute Myocardial Infarction (%) 
Use of Invasive Procedures 
All Patients  No Procedures  Catheterization Only  Catheterization and PTCA'  Catheterization and CABGb 




Age in years 
Rural 
Catheterization within 90 days 
Percutaneous transluminal 
coronary angioplasty within 
90 days 




Coronary artery bypass graft 














































"Percutaneous  transluminal coronary angioplasty. 
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with cost of  care. Both revascularization procedures, PTCA (DRG 112) and 
CABG (DRGs 106 and 107), involve distinct DRGs with much higher reim- 
bursement levels that reflect the incremental costs of the intensive treatments. 
In contrast, although one might imagine a DRG for “AM1 with CCU admis- 
sion,” there is no incremental reimbursement for treatment involving special- 
ized CCU beds. The implications for DRG classification of the initial hospital- 
izations of AM1 patients are presented in table 5.2, which shows that only 92% 
of  all AM1 patients and only 88% of  male patients aged 65-74  years were 
initially hospitalized in an AMI-related DRG. The other AM1 patients were 
mostly categorized in more intensive DRGs based on the use of invasive or 
surgical treatments. Table  5.2 also shows that the share of  treatment-based 
DRGs is even larger when all hospitalizations within thirty days of the AM1 
are considered. AM1 patients are specifically excluded from the catheterization 
DRGs (124 and 125), but over 1% of patients are hospitalized in these DRGs 
within a month of their AMI. 
Table 5.3 reports means and standard deviations for hospital utilization, re- 
ported hospital costs, and reimbursement for AM1 patients grouped by which 
treatments they received. These statistics are reported for all hospital admis- 
sions during three time intervals after AMI: within thirty days, within ninety 
Table 5.2  Distribution of Admissions for Acute Myocardial Infarction among 
Diagnosis-Related Groups 
All Patients 
(N = 205,021) 
Male Patients Aged 65-74 
(N = 55,570) 
Initial AM1  All Admissions  Initial AM1  All Admissions 
Admission  within 30 Days  Admission  within 30 Days 
Diagnosis-Related Groups  (N = 205,021)  (N = 251,575)  (N = 55,570)  (N = 72,006) 
Acute myocardial  92.0  81.1  88.1  75.4 
infarction (AMI) 
(121,  122, 123) 







(124,  125) 
procedures 
(mainly 109, 115) 
Percutaneous transluminal  2.8  3.9  4.7  6.1 
Catheterization without  0  1.2  0  1.9 
Other cardiovascular  2.5  2.8  2.7  3 .0 
Other  0.5  6.1  0.4  5.2 Table 5.3  Hospital Utilization, Costs,  and Reimbursement for Elderly Patients with Acute Myocardial Infarction 
Use of Invasive Procedures 
All Patients  No Procedures  Catheterization Only  Catheterization and FTCA'  Catheterization and CABGb 
Time Interval after AM1  (N = 205,021)  (N = 155,880)  (N = 22,902)  (N = 10,837)  (N = 15,402) 
Hospital admissions' 
Within 30 days 
Within 90 days 
Within 1 year 
Hospital daysc 
Within 30 days 
Within 90 days 
Within 1 year 
ICU/CCU days' 
Within 30 days 
Within 90 days 


























































































(12.15) Total hospital costs (Qd 
Within 30 days 
Within 90 days 
Within 1 year 
Total hospital reimbursement 
Within 30 days 
Within 90 days 

























Note:  Standard errors in parentheses. 
“Percutaneous  transluminal coronary angioplasty. 
bCoronary  artery bypass graft. 
<Number  of admissions, number of total hospital days, and number of ICU or CCU days were calculated from Medicare claims. 
dReported  departmental costs for each hospitalization were calculated by multiplying the reported departmental charges for a hospitalization by the PPS cost- 
to-charge ratio for that hospital department and summing the resulting cost estimates across all departments. Reported routine costs were calculated by 
determining the average accounting cost per day for Medicare patients by bed type (standard, ICU, CCU) and multiplying by the number of days spent in each 
bed type during the admission. Total reported operating costs are the sum of  these two components; DRG payments are intended to reimburse hospitals for 
these operating costs. As noted above, these reported costs are not perfect measures of “true” average incremental costs to the hospital and so should only be 
interpreted qualitatively. 
‘Reimbursement rates were calculated for each admission by summing DRG-based payments and DRG outlier payments (if any). 172  Mark B. McClellan 
days, and within one year. Compared to patients not undergoing invasive proce- 
dures, patients undergoing one or more of the procedures used hospitals more 
intensively (in terms of number of  admissions, total days, and intensive-care 
days) and incurred substantially  higher costs. But reimbursement totaled a rela- 
tively constant proportion of reported costs, regardless of procedure use. For 
example, within ninety days of AMI, total DRG reimbursement for patients 
not undergoing procedures was 89% of reported costs ($6,177 versus $6.953 
on average), for patients undergoing catheterization only was  82% of  costs 
($8,749 versus $10,697), for patients undergoing catheterization and PTCA 
was 89%  of reported costs ($12,146  versus $13,614),  and for patients undergo- 
ing catheterization and CABG was  94% of  reported costs ($23,708 versus 
$25,221).  Thus, for these intensive procedures used in the management of AM1 
patients, PPS reimbursement tracks costs quite closely on a~erage.'~ 
In contrast, table 5.4 reports summary statistics for patients grouped on the 
basis of whether or not they stayed in a specialized CCU or ICU bed for more 
than two days during their acute AM1 treatment. Patients with acute CCUdCU 
stays of two days or less had costs significantly lower than those of patients 
with stays over two days. Reimbursement differences between the two groups 
were much more modest, however, so that patients receiving two days or less 
of CCUhCU treatment had average reimbursement levels 29%  higher than av- 
erage hospital costs within ninety days of AM1 ($5,133 versus $3,971), while 
average reimbursement was only 77%  of costs for patients receiving more than 
two days' CCU/ICU treatment ($6,802 versus $8,855). Such a pattern is ex- 
pected under prospective payment-patients  requiring more CCU/ICU days 
are sicker than those who do not-but  the pattern differs markedly from that 
observed for intensive technologies with separate DRGs. Because DRG pay- 
ments are largely independent of CCUhCU use, additional CCU days lead to 
relatively little additional hospital reimbursement. 
The association between reimbursement and treatment intensity for AM1 
illustrates the financial incentives for hospital investments in medical techno- 
logies. Implementing the capacity to perform CABG, PTCA, or cardiac cathe- 
terization, as well as choosing the quantity of  CCU beds to support, are all 
hospital investment decisions that may  have  substantial effects on physician 
decisions for AM1 treatment. As noted in section 5.1, analogous intensive hos- 
pital treatments and treatment-based DRGs exist for many other health prob- 
lems, providing similar relatively low-powered incentives for investments in 
the capacity to perform treatments. 
Table 5.5 suggests that these incentives have had a fundamental effect on the 
15. The slightly lower proportion of cost sharing for patients undergoing catheterization only is 
likely to be a reflection of DRG structure as well. For patients admitted with MI,  only if catheter- 
ization occurs during a subsequent admission does it provide additional reimbursement for the 
hospital. Table 5.2 demonstrates that some patients are  readmitted soon after their initial AM1 
admission to undergo catheterization, which then constitutes a non-AM1 DRG. 173  Medicare Reimbursement and Hospital Cost Growth 
Table 5.4  Hospital Utilization, Costs, and Reimbursement for Elderly Patients with 
Acute Myocardial Infarction, 1987 
Acute Coronary CarelIntensive Care Unit 
All Patients  Two Days or Less  More Than  Wo  Days 
Time Interval after AM1  (N = 205,021)  (N  = 60,707)  (N  = 95,103) 
Hospital admissions 
Within 30 days 
Within 90 days 
Within 1 year 
Hospital days 
Within 30 days 
Within 90 days 
Within 1 year 
CCUlICU days 
Within 30 days 
Within 90 days 
Within 1 year 
Total hospital costs ($) 
Within 30 days 
Within 90 days 
Within 1 year 
Total hospital reimbursement ($) 
Within 30 days 
Within 90 days 









































































Note:  Standard errors in parentheses. 
nature of  hospital expenditure growth since the adoption of  PPS. The table 
summarizes changes in admissions and hospital treatment intensity between 
1983 and  1988 for  some common  health problems  for  which  alternative 
diagnosis- and treatment-based DRGs exist. The table includes all health prob- 
lems that are indications for the principal inpatient surgical procedures reim- Table 5.5  Changes in Hospital Treatment Patterns for Common Health Problems in the Elderly 
Surgical Treatment Diagnosis-Related Groups  Alternative Nonsurgical Diagnosis-Related Groups 
Diagnosis-  1988 Discharges  Diagnosis- 
Related  Relative  (% change from  Related 
Group  Description  Weight  1983 base)  Group 
1988 Admissions 
Relative  (% change from 
Description  Weight  1983 base) 
Spinal Nerve Compression 
4  Decompression of spinal  2.59  4,970  9  Spinal disorderhnjury  1.24 
canal  (+46.2) 
Medical treatment outside 
hospital 
Cerebrovascular  Disease 
5  Carotid endarterectomy"  1.57  47,530  14  Specific cerebrovascular disorder  1.24 
15  Transient ischemic attack  0.62 
(+8.3)  (except transient ischemic attack) 
16  Nonspecific cerebrovascular  1.03 
disorder (except transient 
ischemic attack) with 
complicating conditions  0.63 
disorder (except transient 
ischemic attack) without 
complicating conditions 
Medical treatment outside 
hospital 












Coronary  artery  bypass 
graft with catheterization 















Coronary Heart Diseuse 
5.54  61,815  121  Acute myocardial infarction with 
3.99  44,790  122  Acute myocardial infarction 
(+  1,260.1)  complicating conditions 
(- 11  .O)  without complicating conditions 
1.89  109,830  123  Acute myocardial infarction, 
(+211.5)  expired 
1.18  197,175  140  Angina pectoris (cardiac-related 
(+414.5)  chest pain) 
0.69  132  Atherosclerosis with 
complicating conditions 







0.67  367,585 
(+34.5) 
0.80  23,420 
0.60 
(-92.0) Table 5.5  (continued) 
Surgical Treatment Diagnosis-Related Groups  Alternative Nonsurgical Diagnosis-Related Groups 
Diagnosis-  1988 Discharges  Diagnosis-  1988 Admissions 
Related  Relative  (% change from  Related  Relative  (% change from 
Group  Description  Weight  1983 base)  Group  Description  Weight  1983 base) 





116  Pacemaker implantation 
104  Cardiac valve procedure 
with pump and cardiac 
catheterization 
with pump, without 
catheterization 
105  Cardiac valve procedure 
148  Major small and large 
bowel procedures with 
complicating conditions 




Cardiac Rhythm Irregularity 
4.05  58,300  138  Cardiac arrhythmia with  0.85  254,705 
2.77 
(+6.5)  complicating conditions  (+  11.2) 
139  Cardiac arrhythmia without  0.59 
complicating conditions 
Cardiac Valvular Disease 
7.34  12,015  135  Cardiac congenital and valvular  0.92 
(+  1,869.5)  disorders with complicating 
conditions 
5.78  12,010  136  Cardiac congenital and valvular  0.61 
(+18.0)  disorders without complicating 
conditions 
Small and Large Intestinal Disorders 









Total cholecystectomy  2.39 
with contrast dye 
enhancement with 
complicating conditions' 
Total cholecystectomy  1.69 
with contrast dye 
enhancement without 
complicating conditions' 
Total cholecystectomy  1.88 
without contrast dye 
enhancement with 
complicating conditionsc 
without contrast dye 
enhancement without 
complicating conditionsc 
Total cholecystectomy  1.12 
161  InguinaVfemoral hernia  0.75 




162  InguinaVfemoral hernia  0.50 
(continued) 
Gall Bladder and Biliary Disorders 
28,285  207  Biliary tract disorder with 
(+284.3)  complicating conditions 
0.92  52,475 
(-22.9) 






(-3  1.2) 
Medical treatment outside 
hospital 
None Table 5.5  (continued) 
~~  ~~  ~  ~~~~ 
Surgical Treatment Diagnosis-Related Groups  Alternative Nonsurgical Diagnosis-Related Groups 
Diagnosis-  1988 Discharges  Diagnosis-  1988  Admissions 
Related  Relative  (% change from  Related  Relative  (% change from 
Group  Description  Weight  1983 base)  Group  Description  Weight  1983 base) 
Arthritis of Hip 
-  209  Hip replacement  2.42  209,080  Medical treatment outside 
(+78.0)  hospital 
Hip Fracture 
210  Open reduction of hip/  2.18  139,310  235  Fracture of femur  1.21 
femur fracture with  (+29.3) 
complicating conditions 
femur fracture without 
complicating conditions 
211  Open reduction of hip/  1.61  236  Fracture of hip  0.90 
Back Pain 
214  Intervertebral  2.14  62,550  243  Back problem  0.67  129,050 
diskectomy with  (+87.  I)  (-38.2) 
complicating conditions 
diskectomy without  hospital 
complicating conditions 









Total mastectomy with  1.04  59,155 
complicating conditions  (+44.1) 
Total mastectomy  0.85 
without complicating 
conditions 
Subtotal mastectomy  1 .oo 
with complicating 
conditions 









Transurethral  0.75 
prostatectomy without 
complicating conditions 
Benign Prostatic Hypertrophy 
1.08  207,570  348  Benign prostatic hypertrophy  0.66 
(+35.5)  with complicating conditions 
349  Benign prostatic hypertrophy  0.40 
without complicating conditions 




(continued) Table 5.5  (continued) 
Surgical Treatment Diagnosis-Related Groups  Alternative Nonsurgical Diagnosis-Related Groups 
Diagnosis-  1988 Discharges  Diagnosis- 
Related  Relative  (% change from  Related 
Group  Description  Weight  1983 base)  Group 
1988 Admissions 
Relative  (% change from 
Description  Weight  1983 base) 
Cancer (nonsurgical treatments) 
409  Radiotherapyd  1.08  8,530 
410  Chemotherapyd  0.47  137,890 
Surgical discharge  191 
rate per 1  ,OOO elderly 
(+85.8) 
(  +  248.3) 
(+33.6) 
None 
Nonsurgical discharge rate per 
1,000  elderly 
121 
(-50.0) 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
"During the time period, new clinical evidence suggested these procedures are often ineffective. 
bSome  other surgical procedures for coronary heart disease account for a small proportion of admissions in this DRG. 
Tontrast dye enhancement is an intraoperative radiological procedure. 
dThough  these cancer therapies comprise treatment-based DRGs, they are not surgical procedures. 181  Medicare Reimbursement and Hospital Cost Growth 
bursed separately under PPS, as well as the alternative nonsurgical DRGs.I6  In 
general, the use of technologies that constituted treatment-based DRGs for 
each of these health problems increased substantially between 1983 and 1988. 
For example, the use of  CABG and FTCA as intensive treatments for heart 
disease doubled between 1983 and 1988, reflecting the increased investment 
in cardiac surgery capacity and the complete cost sharing documented above. 
Other intensive DRG-based treatments for health problems that showed sub- 
stantial increases in utilization rates included valve-replacement procedures as 
a treatment for heart valve diseases, cholecystectomy as a treatment for gall 
bladder disease, open reductions in the treatment of hip fracture, diskectomy 
in the treatment of  back pain, and prostatectomy in the treatment of  benign 
prostatic hypertrophy. Hospitalizations in treatment-based DRGs for diseases 
without alternative  hospital treatments-such  as joint replacement for arthritis 
and  chemotherapy for cancer-also  increased substantially. Altogether, the 
surgical admission rate for elderly Medicare beneficiaries increased by a third 
between 1983 and 1988, while the nonsurgical admission rate fell by one-half. 
Table 5.6 summarizes changes in admissions and intensity between 1983 
and 1988 for some common “single DRG’ diseases, those that do not have 
distinct DRGs for more intensive treatments.  Three of these health problems- 
chronic obstructive  pulmonary disease, pneumonia and pleurisy, and bronchitis 
and asthma-show  intensity increases, though the large changes in admission 
rates for these respiratory diseases imply that underlying coding changes make 
it difficult to compare the 1983 and 1988 populations. For most of these health 
problems, however, average intensity was virtually unchanged or fell, and total 
admissions declined. Treatment intensity growth thus  appears much  more 
modest for health problems where hospitals face single prices regardless of 
intensity decisions. 
McClellan (1993) reviews more comprehensive evidence on these intensity 
trends, confirming that actual hospital expenditure growth appears to reflect 
the reimbursement incentives illustrated here. In particular, more use of  spe- 
cific intensive procedures (especially surgical procedures) appears to account 
for all Medicare hospital expenditure growth. These trends do not appear to be 
part of  a general technological imperative toward more intensive treatment. 
For example, the reimbursement incentives for AM1 illustrated that ICU and 
CCU bed use is associated with relatively little additional reimbursement, and 
in fact the total number of ICU and CCU beds has been relatively flat since 
PPS was adopted. These findings, based entirely on aggregate statistical data 
16. For many DRGs, separate groups exist for cases with and  without “complicating condi- 
tions.” The DRGs with complications  are reimbursed at somewhat higher rates than those without, 
with the goal of providing “fair” reimbursement for sicker patients within the diagnosis group as 
well  as incentives for upcoding or “DRG creep.” Both prices influence hospital investments in 
intensive technologies. To  abstract from coding instability that severely affected admission pat- 
terns in DRGs with versus without complicating  conditions  during this period, I group DRGs with 
and without complicating conditions together in the descriptive tables. 182  Mark B. McCleUan 
Table 5.6  Trends  in Intensity and Admissions for Health Problems without 
High-Intensity Treatment Diagnosis-Related  Groups 
Change  1988 
Diagnosis-  1983  1988  in  Admissions 
Related  Intensity  Intensity  Intensity,  (% change 















Degenerative nervous system 
disorders 
Hypertensive encephalopathy 




































-  .08 
-.I6 
-.09 
+  .02 
+  .09 
+.13 
+.15 





























on Medicare hospital utilization, are obviously preliminary. But they suggest 
that hospitals have responded quite dramatically to actual PPS incentives for 
treatment intensity. 
5.5  Conclusions 
Exogenous technological progress is viewed as a principal cause of growth 
in health care costs (Newhouse 1992), and the adoption and diffusion of new 
technologies desired by  patients clearly  represents a major  component of 
Medicare hospital expenditure growth. In this paper, however, I have argued 
that technological change may in fact be endogenous to reimbursement incen- 
tives. This argument required a review of  the details of hospital production and 
of  a model for capturing static reimbursement incentives adequately, as well 183  Medicare Reimbursement and Hospital Cost Growth 
as the development of  arguments for why the current structure of PPS reim- 
bursement rules may  lead to changes in  equilibrium intensity choices over 
time. While the development of a formal model of hospital technology adop- 
tion decisions in the context of the model presented here awaits further work,” 
some important implications for technology diffusion are evident. For health 
problems with multiple DRGs for different levels of treatment intensity, inno- 
vations are favored that shift the net benefit distribution to permit “marginal” 
patients to be treated in more intensive DRGs. For example, innovations that 
reduce operative mortality and morbidity for specifically reimbursed surgical 
procedures will be adopted and will lead to dynamic cost increases through 
more  intensive  treatment  of  the  disease.  For  diseases  without  intensive 
treatment-based DRGs, such technologies are less likely to be adopted. In 
these cases, the adoption of  cost-reducing technologies may complement the 
dynamic decline in costs outlined previously. 
The theoretical and empirical results presented here suggest that current PPS 
incentives are unlikely to achieve stated policy goals. In particular, they proba- 
bly will not limit the use of intensive treatments with small marginal expected 
benefits. As the previous section and McClellan (1993) suggested, improve- 
ments in these incentives appear feasible through simple reforms in the DRG 
payment structure. First, for health problems for which production is competi- 
tive or for which physician incentives are likely to determine equilibrium inten- 
sity choices, the regulator’s basic goal should be to set a single price for all 
alternative treatments for the health problem. Indeed, the regulator need only 
get the aggregate price level right for the set of health problems that rely on 
similar hospital technologies. Concerns about hospitals engaging in  more 
patient-selection behavior if  incentives really were high-powered, or about 
hospitals going out of business because of the high resulting variance in pay- 
ments, are legitimate reasons for providing some cost sharing through DRG 
structure. Such concerns can be addressed by allowing partial but not complete 
price differentials for DRGs that lead to payment variation based on intensity 
within a diagnosis. Alternatively, they might be addressed through other fea- 
tures of  the payment system. The present  system uses “outlier” payments, 
17. Most biomedical research is conducted not by  the clinical divisions of  hospitals  but by 
their biomedical research divisions and separate research organizations. Funding for biomedical 
research, primarily from the federal government, is largely independent of Medicare funding for 
patient care. Consequently, technology diffusion rather than innovation itself has greater conse- 
quences for medical costs. In a standard model of diffusion, the firm compares its expected profit 
stream from investing in the innovation during this period to the expected profit stream associated 
with waiting until the next period (Reinganum 1989). Fm heterogeneity leads to heterogeneity 
in observed adoption times and frequency of use. Incentives for technology adoption include the 
reimbursement  rules and demand responses  associated with the technology. Thus the intuitive 
prediction of the model developed here is that technological diffusion will tend to be more rapid 
for the types of technologies favored by the DRG system. 184  Mark B. McClellan 
which are essentially supplemental cost-sharing payments for very expensive 
admissions, to address these issues. 
Second, if hospitals have more control over equilibrium intensity for a health 
problem and they face upward-sloping demand curves, then separate intensity- 
based DRGs may be optimal. However, these DRGs should not be designed to 
reflect completely the cost differential of producing the more intensive treat- 
ment, unless demand is completely inelastic (which seems improbable). In- 
stead, the price differential should partially reflect the cost differential, and the 
price of the low-intensity treatment can be increased as needed to assure that 
hospitals will not find it more profitable to forgo treating patients altogether. 
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COIllUlent  Thomas E. MaCurdy 
Reduced to its essence, McClellan’s paper represents the beginnings of  a re- 
search effort designed to address the following issue: viewing the prospective 
payment system (PPS) as regulatory structure, how should one define diagnos- 
tic groups (DRGs) to provide the prerequisite amount of  health care while 
simultaneously controlling costs? To  highlight the paper’s achievements in 
confronting this issue, my comment first outlines the basic economic model 
proposed to describe behavior in the health care industry. I next explain how 
the paper interprets PPS as a regulatory system. Finally, I offer an annotated 
list of major enhancements needed to develop a richer framework that offers a 
basis for understanding the critical factors relevant in fashioning PPS to govern 
the provision of health care. 
Basic Behavioral Model 
McClellan’s basic economic model operates as follows. Patients develop 
health conditions of  unknown severity. For each illness, two medical proce- 
dures are available as treatment: intensive and nonintensive. Patients choose 
hospitals based on the likelihood of  receiving intensive treatment. The inten- 
sity of treatment offered by a hospital is determined solely by its investment in 
technology, with higher investment raising the likelihood of intensive treat- 
ment. Hospitals act to maximize profits in a way that balances the expense of 
investment with the extent to which investment attracts patients. Physicians 
play a purely passive role. Assigned to hospitals in an unspecified manner, 
they observe the severity of the health condition afflicting each patient. They 
mechanically  act to provide intensive treatment when a patient’s illness reaches 
a sufficiently high level of severity. 
To  describe the formal framework in greater detail, initially consider the 
behavior of the patients. For their health conditions, they can receive one of 
two treatments: nonintensive, indicated by  the discrete variable r taking the 
value r = 0; and intensive, indicated by r = 1. The outcome from treatment is 
a random variable y (my notation) generated by  the following rule: y = y* 
when r = 0; y  = y*  + 8 >  y* when r = 1, where y* is a latent variable with 
a mean equal to p., and 8 is a random variable whose cumulative distribution 
function is F(B), with F(0) = 0 (i.e., Prob(8 > 0) = 1). Both y*  and 8 are 
unobserved by  the patient. The outcome expected by  the patient when he or 
she enters a hospital for treatment is 
E(y)  = p. + E(B I r = l)p(r = 1). 
The patient chooses that hospital offering the highest expected value. 
Physicians play a routine role. In effect, they act to maximize patients’ wel- 
Thomas E. MaCurdy is professor of economics at Stanford University and a research associate 
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fare subject to a hospital’s treatment capacity. They observe 8 and implement 
r = 1 whenever 8 >  A, where A = A(Z) is a threshold defined by a hospital’s 
level of investment, Z, in capital and technology. With this mechanism, the ex- 
pected value of an outcome perceived by a patient becomes 
+ E(8 I 8 >  A) Prob(0 >  A).  E(y)  = 
The function A = A(Z) is a declining function of I. So a hospital makes itself 
more attractive to patients by raising the value of I and thereby lowering the 
value of A. 
Finally, the hospital’s behavior receives extensive consideration covering 
several circumstances. In all of these circumstances,  a hospital’s objective is to 
choose a level of investment I (or equivalently the value of A) to maximize its 
net revenue. Consider the two types of procedures. The nonintensive treatment 
receives revenue equal to po  at a cost equal to co, and the intensive treatment 
receives revenue pI  at a cost cI.  The costs co and cI  may  be nonincreasing 
functions of 1. Higher levels of investment make the use of the intensive treat- 
ment more likely by lowering the value of A. McClellan considers four catego- 
ries of investment or choices of technology. 
1.  In the case of  “specific fixed capacity,” the hospital chooses Z  to max- 
imize profits given by 
where A = A(Z), F(A) is the fraction of patients who receive the nonintensive 
treatment, q is demand for the hospital’s services and equals the number of 
patients, and b is the cost of a unit of investment. In optimizing this problem, 
the number of  treatments cannot exceed a fixed capacity; satisfaction of the 
constraint (1 -  F(A))q(A) 5 I captures this condition. The demand q is a 
declining function of A, and therefore it is an increasing function of I. 
2.  In the case of “nonspecific fixed capacity,” investment is a joint input 
into treating several classifications of health conditions. Using index k to desig- 
nate these classifications,  the hospital chooses Z  to maximize 
where each rIk  takes a form analogous to II in the previous expression. In this 
optimization problem, satisfaction of the constraint C, (1 -  Fk(A))q,(A) 5  Z 
ensures that the number of procedures does not exceed a fixed capacity for all 
available treatments. 
3.  In the case of  the “line of  business,” investment is lumpy and is either 
undertaken at the level 1  or not at all. Thus, the hospital chooses I = 1  if n(1) 
> n(O),  and Z  = 0 otherwise, where rI once again looks like the specification 
in category 1. 
4.  Finally, the “intermediate technology” case is an unspecified variant of 
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The first-order conditions associated with the optimization of  categories 1-3 
provide the primary motivation for the behavioral claims made in the paper. 
Regulatory Structure 
The basic regulatory problem in PPS is to define DRGs in a way that bal- 
ances the provisions of health care with the costs of supplying this care. Within 
the framework outlined so far, there are two options for specifying DRGs. One 
can combine the intensive and the nonintensive procedures into a single DRG. 
This means that the hospital receives the same revenue regardless of  which 
treatment prevails, and therefore, po =  p,.  Alternatively, one can categorize the 
two treatments as distinct DRGs, in which case p,  >  po. 
Many health-policy decision makers and researchers believe that DRGs as- 
sociated with a particular illness are primarily covered by  the first option, 
where compensation does not depend on the intensity of treatment. However, 
McClellan usefully points out that in fact a large fraction of DRGs represent 
applications of  the second option. This is especially true when considering 
surgical treatments. A surgical procedure often is defined as its own DRG. 
McClellan uses heart attacks as an illustration. A patient experiencing heart 
attacks can be categorized into any one of many DRGs: three represent varying 
degrees of intrusive treatments involving cardiac surgery and an even greater 
number represent nonintensive classifications such as drug treatments. The re- 
sulting practice looks very  much like a cost-based reimbursement system, 
which PPS was designed to replace. 
McClellan provides some intriguing evidence suggesting that this feature of 
the current system is a major factor in explaining the growth in health costs 
since the introduction of PPS. A related paper (McClellan 1996)  provides stark 
evidence supporting this argument. Around the time of the introduction of PPS 
in the early 1980s, the trend in nonsurgical discharges for the elderly reversed 
direction from a continuous increase to a steady decline. At the same time, 
surgical discharges rose steadily and at a higher rate after the introduction of 
PPS. Because nonsurgical treatments tend to receive lower reimbursements on 
average, such evidence supports the view that medical practitioners treat pa- 
tients using intensive procedures in order to justify a more lucrative DRG clas- 
sification. McClellan further notes that the number of DRGs assigned to each 
admittee has steadily increased, with index per beneficiary rising by  20% in 
recent years. 
The problem of creating an optimal classification scheme for DRGs is quite 
complicated, and it receives only peripheral discussion in the paper. The trade- 
offs are clear. Grouping various medical procedures into one DRG means that 
the more expensive treatment will only be applied if there are substantial ad- 
vantages to its implementation compared to other alternatives in the DRG for 
the patient in question. On the other hand, such a grouping lowers the incen- 
tives of hospitals to invest in the technology needed for more intensive proce- 
dures, which lessens their use for marginal patients who could benefit. The 188  Mark B. McCIellan 
model provided in McClellan’s paper does not offer a rich enough structure to 
solve the problem of defining DRGs from a regulatory perspective. In particu- 
lar, the model needs to specify the willingness of informed patients to pay for 
more intensive treatments. 
Proposed Development 
McClellan’s research to date provides a preliminary structure to assess how 
DRG definitions balance the trade-offs between costs and the provision of 
health care. However, there are several obvious dimensions for augmenting the 
current model to better address the basic regulatory problem of reforming PPS. 
I briefly mention four such enhancements. 
1. McClellan’s existing formulation is a partial equilibrium model. It is in- 
complete in two important respects: first, it does not specify the factors de- 
termining the demand for health care q;  and, second, it is silent about the in- 
dustrial organization underlying the behavior of medical service providers. 
In McClellan’s model, the demand for medical care is determined by  the 
function q, which in turn depends only on the likelihood of receiving intensive 
care. Such a formulation may have some appeal in describing Medicare de- 
mand in the current system, because in theory price does not influence the 
demand for medical care by  Medicare patients. However, even in defining 
DRGs in the current system, it is necessary to introduce a demand for health 
care that specifies patients’ willingness to pay for various procedures. Without 
it, one has no basis for comparing the merits of alternative  structures.  The need 
to elaborate the demand side becomes even more obvious when one considers 
additional aspects of the regulatory problem such as copayments. 
Adding an industrial-organizational  component to the model specifies hos- 
pitals’ assumptions about the actions of other health care providers. There are 
several  standard formulations, including perfect  competition or  oligopoly 
models (e.g., Cournot). A broader range of  formulations may be appropriate 
for describing the behavior of nonprofit hospitals. Industrial organization will 
play a critical role in any consideration of the regulatory problem of the health 
care industry. It will not only determine the tendency of hospitals to overinvest 
in technology from a societal perspective-as  happens in patent races, a well- 
known example in the industrial-organizational  literature-but  it will also play 
a key role in determining the specification of the demand curves (q) faced by 
individual health care providers. 
2. McClellan’s current model does not adequately specify the behavior of 
physicians. Physicians are not robotic agents acting to maximize patients’ wel- 
fare subject to hospitals’ costs conditions. Instead, physicians act to optimize 
their own benefits, and indeed their actions may sacrifice the welfare of both 
the patients and the hospitals. One often suspects that the use of  particular 
medical procedures may primarily reflect the compensation received by doc- 189  Medicare Reimbursement and Hospital Cost Growth 
tors, with only a peripheral link to patients’ welfare or to hospitals’ costs. Crit- 
ics of such behavior often cite unnecessary surgery as a prime example. 
Introducing physicians’ incentives into McClellan’s model is not straightfor- 
ward and will undoubtedly result in significant changes in behavioral implica- 
tions. A conflict arises among patients’, physicians’, and hospitals’ incentives. 
Since hospitals do not observe 8 or aspects of  A, they face a principal-agent 
problem in their interactions with physicians, with the hospital playing the role 
of the principal. Similarly, patients face a principal-agent problem in their in- 
teractions with physicians and hospitals. These are important behavioral rela- 
tionships that are central to understanding  the effectiveness of PPS regulations. 
3.  Accounting for the multiproduct nature of hospitals would provide an- 
other important enhancement to McClellan’s model. Most medical providers, 
and certainly hospitals, produce an array of products simultaneously. Such con- 
siderations introduce significant complications in the analysis when properly 
incorporated into an economic framework. The section of  the paper dealing 
with nonspecific fixed-capacity investment highlights the added complications 
of considering multiple products produced by hospitals. Because many techno- 
logies affect the availability of a spectrum of medical procedures, not only is 
it true that investment enriches the capability of a hospital to perform a group 
of sophisticated procedures, but it is also true that a substantial degree of sub- 
stitutability may arise among the procedures making up this group. Even more 
important, the multiproduct nature of hospitals makes it exceedingly difficult 
to assign or measure costs of particular treatments, a critical assumption main- 
tained throughout McClellan’s formulation. 
4.  Finally, introducing an explicit formulation for the economic problem 
faced by regulators is vital if one wants to study the consequences of alterna- 
tive PPS schemes. This involves specifying the overall objectives that regula- 
tors, patients, physicians, and hospitals act to optimize, as well as the informa- 
tion sets available to all agents. The resulting problem faced by the regulator is 
quite complicated, with several game-theoretic and principal-agent structures 
possible to describe behavior in the health care industry.  Analyses of alternative 
PPS  schemes will undoubtedly depend on the particular formulation for the 
regulatory problem. The optimal structure for DRG categories under the as- 
sumption that physicians act to maximize patients’ welfare and hospitals act 
to maximize profits will look quite different than under the assumption that 
agents act to satisfy other objectives. A vast literature exists on the regulation 
of public utilities (e.g., A Theory of  Incentives in Procurement and Regulation 
by Jean Laffont). This body of research offers a rich source for analyzing alter- 
native PPS structures. 
Conclusion 
McClellan’s paper is an enlightening contribution to a topic that is central to 
the upcoming debate on the financing of health care. I know that McClellan is 190  Mark B. McClellan 
planning to continue with this research project, and I view it as some of the 
most promising work in the health-economics area. In my  comments, I have 
taken a time-honored approach of suggesting generalizations of the approach 
proposed in the paper. Introducing these generalizations will undoubtedly re- 
quire significant effort and a comprehensive long-term research plan, but I ex- 
pect large payoffs from this activity. 
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